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Semi-autonomous driving is a complex task domain with a broad range of problems to 
consider. The human operator’s role in semi-autonomous driving is crucial because safety and 
performance depends on how the operator interacts with the system. Drive difficulty has not 
been extensively studied in automated driving systems and thus is not well understood. 
Additionally, few studies have studied trust development, decline, or repair over multiple drives 
for automated driving systems. The goal of this study was to test the effect of perceived driving 
difficulty on human trust in the automation and how trust is dynamically learned, reduced due to 
automation errors, and repaired over a seven-drive series. The experiment used 2 task difficulty 
conditions (easy vs. difficult) x 3 error type conditions (no error, takeover request or TOR, 
failure) x 7 drives mixed design. Lighting condition was used as a proxy for driving difficulty 
because decreased visibility for potential hazards could make monitoring the road difficult. 
During the experiment, 122 undergraduate participants drove an automated vehicle seven times 
in either a daytime (i.e., “easy”) or nighttime (i.e., “difficult”) condition. Participants 
experienced a critical hazard event in the fourth drive, in which the automation perfectly avoided 
the hazard (“no error” condition), issued a takeover request (“TOR” condition), or failed to 
notice and respond to the hazard (“failure” condition). Participants completed trust ratings after 
   
 
each drive to establish trust development. Results showed that trust improved through the first 
three drives, demonstrating proper trust calibration. The TOR and automation failure conditions 
saw significant decreases in trust after the critical hazard in drive four, whereas trust was 
unaffected for the no error condition. Trust naturally repaired in the TOR and failure conditions 
after the critical event but did not recover to previous levels before the critical event. There was 
no evidence of perceived difficulty differences between the daytime and nighttime conditions. 
Thus, a consistent lack of trust differences was found between lighting conditions. This study 
demonstrated how trust develops and responds to errors in automated driving systems, informing 
future research for trust repair interventions and design of automated driving systems.
   
 
iv 
Copyright, 2019, by Scott Mishler, All Rights Reserved.  
   
 
v 
This thesis is dedicated to my incredible parents, Ty and Christy Mishler for their endless 




























I would like to thank all of those that helped me with the completion of this thesis. Many 
thanks to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Jing Chen, for all of the time, work, and guidance 
that she has given to me and this project. Additional thanks to my committee members Dr. James 
Bliss and Dr. Kristin Heron for their work and contribution to this thesis. I would also like to 
thank the undergraduate research assistants that helped with data collection: Joseph Ciely, Faye 





















ADOS Automated Driving Opinion Survey  
DDT  Dynamic Driving Task  
RT  Reaction Time  
TOR Takeover Request  
TTC Time To Collision 
UAS  Usefulness of Automated System  
   
 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ...........................................................................................................................x 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xi 
1. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1 
1.1 AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES .......................................................................................3 
1.2 TAKEOVER REQUESTS .............................................................................................5 
1.3 TRUST IN AUTOMATION..........................................................................................6 
1.3.1 DISPOSITIONAL TRUST AND LEARNED TRUST. ........................................ 7 
1.3.2 DYNAMICALLY LEARNED TRUST. .................................................................. 7 
1.3.3 TRUST DECLINE DUE TO ERROR...................................................................... 8 
1.3.4 TRUST REPAIR. ........................................................................................................ 9 
1.4 TRUST FOR EASY AND DIFFICULT TASKS ........................................................10 
1.5 CURRENT STUDY.....................................................................................................12 
1.6 HYPOTHESES ............................................................................................................16 
2. METHOD ................................................................................................................................19 
2.1 DESIGN .......................................................................................................................19 
2.1.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. ............................................................................. 19 
2.1.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES. ................................................................................. 22 
2.2 PARTICIPANTS .........................................................................................................23 
2.3 APPARATUS AND STIMULI ...................................................................................24 
2.3.1 STISIM. ...................................................................................................................... 25 
2.4 MEASURES ................................................................................................................26 
2.4.1 DEMOGRAPHICS. .................................................................................................. 26 
2.4.2 AUTOMATED DRIVING OPINION SURVEY (ADOS). ................................ 26 
2.4.3 TRUST IN AUTOMATION SCALE. .................................................................... 27 
2.4.4 PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY RATING. ................................................................. 28 
2.4.5 USEFULNESS OF AUTOMATED SYSTEM (UAS). ....................................... 29 
2.5 PROCEDURE ..............................................................................................................29 
2.5.1 PRACTICE TASK. ................................................................................................... 30 
2.5.2 EXPERIMENTAL TASK. ....................................................................................... 31 
3. RESULTS ................................................................................................................................33 
3.1 SUBJECTIVE DRIVE DIFFICULTY ........................................................................33 
3.2 SUBJECTIVE TRUST ................................................................................................34 
3.2.1 PRE-DRIVE TRUST. ............................................................................................... 34 
3.2.2 OVERALL TRUST – DRIVES 1-7. ...................................................................... 36 
   
 
ix 
3.2.3 DYNAMICALLY LEARNED TRUST. ................................................................ 37 
3.2.4 TRUST IN DRIVE 4. ............................................................................................... 39 
3.2.5 TRUST REPAIR. ...................................................................................................... 39 
3.3 PERFORMANCE MEASURES - DRIVE 4 ...............................................................40 
3.3.1 ACCURACY. ............................................................................................................ 41 
3.3.2 REACTION TIME. ................................................................................................... 42 
3.4 USEFULNESS OF AUTOMATION (UAS) ...............................................................43 
4. DISCUSSION ..........................................................................................................................46 
4.1 SUBJECTIVE TRUST ................................................................................................46 
4.1.1 PRE-DRIVE TRUST. ............................................................................................... 46 
4.1.2 OVERALL TRUST. ................................................................................................. 47 
4.1.3 DYNAMICALLY LEARNED TRUST. ................................................................ 49 
4.1.4 DRIVE 4 TRUST. ..................................................................................................... 51 
4.1.5 TRUST REPAIR. ...................................................................................................... 51 
4.2 DRIVE DIFFICULTY .................................................................................................52 
4.3 DRIVER PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................54 
4.3.1 ACCURACY. ............................................................................................................ 54 
4.3.2 RT. ............................................................................................................................... 55 
4.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................55 
4.5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................58 
5. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................60 
6. APPENDICES ......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
A. A PRIORI POWER ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 71 
B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SURVEY ................................................... 72 
C. AUTOMATED DRIVING OPINION SURVEY ................................................. 73 
D. HUMAN-COMPUTER TRUST QUESTIONNAIRE ......................................... 75 
E. USEFULNESS OF AUTOMATED SYSTEM SURVEY ................................... 76 
7. VITA ........................................................................................................................................77 
 
   
 
x 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table                                   Page 
1. The Six Experimental Groups used in the Study .......................................................................14 
2. Each of the Six Assorted Hazards Present in the Seven Drives ................................................15 












   
 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure                           Page 
1. The Logitech G920 Racing Wheel and Pedals Used in the Experiment ...................................24 
2. The Setup of the Driving Simulator from the View of the Participant ......................................25 
3. Screenshots of the construction hazard for both lighting conditions .........................................26 
4. The Experimental Procedure ......................................................................................................30 
5. Subjective Difficulty for each Drive ..........................................................................................34 
6. Trust for all Seven Drives ..........................................................................................................37 
7. Initial Learned Trust and Trust at Drives 1-3 ............................................................................38 
8. Trust Repair After a Critical Event in Drive 4 with TOR and Failure Condition Merged ........40 
9. Accuracy as a Function of Error Type and Lighting Condition ................................................42 
10. RT for Error Type and Lighting Condition with Crash Trials Removed ................................43 
11. UAS for Error Type and Lighting Condition ...........................................................................45 
 
 





Autonomous vehicles are quickly becoming a prominent factor in society. Many 
companies new to automobiles like Tesla, Uber, and Google are trying to develop autonomous 
vehicles and the already established automotive companies like GM, Toyota, and BMW are 
implementing more autonomous features. Features like lane-assist and automatic braking are 
already present in many new cars, and fully autonomous vehicles are currently being tested. 
However, this technology is not perfect and sometimes errors occur due to the current limitations 
of the automation. These automation errors create doubt for potential consumers. The level of 
public trust in autonomous vehicles could determine how they will be utilized in the future. If 
humans do not trust the automation to do its job, they will disuse the system, losing any benefits 
it can provide. Conversely, if humans rely on the automation too much, it will lead to misuse of 
the system. Misuse will cause any errors from the system to go unnoticed by the human, 
potentially resulting in fatal consequences (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
 Considerable research has examined human trust in automation and the various factors 
that influence it (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Lee & Moray, 1994; Lee & See, 2004; Schaefer, Chen, 
Szalma, & Hancock, 2015). Additionally, much research has focused on the best ways to design 
automated vehicles to ensure trust is at the proper level of calibration (Fredrick, Mikael, & Jana, 
2017; Helldin, Falkman, Riveiro, & Davidsson, 2013; Verberne, Ham, & Midden, 2012). Among 
different types of trust, situational trust considers factors that are dependent on context and 
therefore affect the development of trust (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). Many external variables in 
automated driving are beyond the driver’s control, such as the design and features of a system, 
setting and environment, and task difficulty. Factors like expertise, self-confidence, and previous 
   
 
2 
experiences are a part of the individual that can vary depending on the task. All these factors are 
important to consider because they directly influence trust development and trust level (Hoff & 
Bashir, 2015).  
Even though these various situational factors can greatly influence trust, a search of the 
literature yielded few studies examining how a difference in driving setting, environment, or 
context can have differential effects on trust. Something as common as driving to work during 
the day when the sun is out and then driving home when the sun has already set demonstrates a 
huge change in driving context. These two situations are different for manual and automated 
driving and could change how someone interacts with the automation. Nighttime driving could 
be perceived as more difficult than daytime driving due to lower visibility and decreased object 
details (Konstantopoulos, Chapman, & Crundall, 2010; Leibowitz & Owens, 1997; Plainis & 
Murray, 2002). Some passengers in a manual vehicle might be less trusting of a human driver 
during nighttime because of the added difficulty. However, automation could reduce concern for 
nighttime driving compared to a human-driven vehicle. Automated vehicles have more 
navigation and vision tools to navigate at night than human drivers, so the automation is likely 
safer than a human driver at night. However, depending on an individual’s perception of the 
situation, their trust could vary for these two lighting conditions.  
Research examining how trust in automated systems changes with automation errors in 
easy and difficult tasks has been done in non-driving scenarios. Madhavan, Wiegmann, and 
Lacson (2006) found in basic signal detection experiments that if an automated aid fails on a task 
that is easy for the operator to perform, this has a stronger negative effect on trust than for a 
difficult-to-perform task. Similarly, human drivers may suffer greater decreases in trust when an 
automated vehicle fails to avoid a hazard in an easy driving condition than in a difficult driving 
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condition. Driving conditions are constantly changing and this could affect human behavior. 
Thus, the current study focused on daytime and nighttime driving conditions, examining how 
automation errors in each context affected trust in automation. This finding would inform 
autonomous vehicle designers whether the automation system might need to adapt depending on 
the external conditions to account for the human factor. Additionally, the study demonstrated a 
trajectory of trust development over seven drives, encapsulating learned trust, decline of trust 
due to errors, and rebuilding of trust to add to the theoretical literature of trust development in an 
automated driving scenario. 
1.1 Autonomous Vehicles 
 Autonomous vehicles were once only a dream of science fiction but are now currently 
being studied and developed for consumer use. Autonomous vehicles will afford humans safer 
travel to and from any destination. In 2015, 35,092 people died in motor vehicle accidents and 
2,443,000 were injured (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2016). Because 
approximately 94% of these incidents were caused by human error (Singh, 2018), autonomous 
vehicles could help to limit the mistakes of human drivers (Anderson et al., 2016; Fagnant & 
Kockelman, 2015; Kalra & Paddock, 2016). Automation has significant benefits over human 
drivers. It is never subject to adverse emotional or physiological states, has better lines of sight 
and vision of the road and traffic, has faster processing speed for multiple concurrent sources of 
data, and better technical driving skill than most human operators (Kalra & Paddock, 2016).  
 The safety of the driver relies on proper assessment of the capabilities of the automation 
in relation to the operational environment, what the automation is going to do, and if he or she 
needs to intervene (Katrakazas, Quddus, Chen, & Deka, 2015; Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996; 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). Automated driving systems may not be able to 
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perfectly identify the hazards in the road every single time. Automation is not 100% perfect, and 
is still susceptible to errors or certain conditions that it is not currently able to operate in. As a 
result, the human driver may need to take over control of the car or assist the automation 
(Leonard et al., 2009). Identification and execution of safe maneuvers that are obvious to the 
human driver may be more difficult for the automated system (Brown & Laurier, 2017; Endsley, 
2017; Parasuraman, Hancock, & Olofinboba, 1997). Therefore, the human driver might need to 
compensate for the limitations of automation. However, not all autonomous vehicles have 
equivalent capabilities. These differences are an important consideration for research and design 
of autonomous vehicles. 
Autonomous vehicles are defined on a continuum based on how much human 
involvement is required (SAE, 2016). Level 5 refers to a fully autonomous vehicle that requires 
no human monitoring or interaction, while Level 0 vehicles have no autonomous function and 
require the human to operate all aspects of the driving task. The intermediate levels have a mix 
of different amounts of human and automation driving. Currently, the highest level of 
commercially available cars is level 2 automation. Level 2 automation cannot operate effectively 
on all types of roads or driving conditions, limited mostly to highway driving. The vehicle is 
capable of lateral and longitudinal motion, but the driver must continuously monitor the 
environment and take over immediately if the system’s limitations are exceeded. Even though 
the current highest level of automation is Level 2, the driver may often see it as something like 
Level 3 or even Level 4, with which they can, and do, engage in secondary tasks, neglecting their 
responsibility to monitor the operational driving environment and be ready to take over (Carsten, 
Lai, Barnard, Jamson, & Merat, 2012; De Winter, Happee, Martens, & Stanton, 2014).  
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Automation is always improving and is very close to level 3 with some companies like 
Audi claiming that the A8 is already capable of level 3 automation. At level 3, the car is capable 
of monitoring the driving environment and the driver must only be prepared to respond to a 
“request to intervene” if the automation determines it needs the human driver to take over. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider both the current level of automation, and what is coming in 
the near future to be prepared when technology catches up. The current study exists between 
Level 2 and Level 3, with a system that can perform sustained lateral and longitudinal vehicle 
motion control, recognize and avoid objects in the driving environment, but still relies on the 
human to monitor the system in case of error and act as a fallback through requests to intervene. 
1.2 Takeover Requests 
 Takeover requests (TOR) are requests to intervene issued by an autonomous vehicle to 
the driver telling the driver to resume control of the vehicle, because the system is no longer 
capable of safe driving (Dogan et al., 2017; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Koo et al., 2015; Sirkin, 
Martelaro, Johns, & Ju, 2017). TORs can arise from a change in road conditions or because of a 
lack of necessary information for effective performance. An example is encountering unexpected 
objects in the road (Leonard et al., 2009; Walch, Lange, Baumann, & Weber, 2015).  
 The automation could issue warnings about a hazard it has noticed and needs the driver’s 
assistance to take over control of the vehicle to maintain safe driving behavior. Proper TOR 
behavior, as explained by Walch et al. (2015), is done by simultaneously interrupting all 
secondary behavior (e.g. music or visualizations on the infotainment display), alerting the driver 
about the situation, and issuing a request for the driver to take over. If the driver realizes the 
situation is a problem, he or she can then resume driving manually.  
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The automation can issue a TOR if a situation is considered outside of its operating 
capabilities. However, the automation may not always judge this quickly enough. Additionally, 
the automation might not detect a hazard in the driving lane. In this case, the human driver must 
be ready to take over control of the vehicle manually, without any warning or announcement of a 
TOR. This is a critical situation and constitutes a complete failure of the automation because the 
human was required to intervene without warning. In contrast, a TOR is not technically 
considered a failure of the automation because it is issuing a warning based on its limitations 
(SAE, 2016). Detection failure situations should become rare as the technology improves and 
advances toward higher levels of automation, although these situations still exist. 
1.3 Trust in Automation 
For automated driving to be effective, the human driver will need to appropriately 
calibrate his or her level of trust in the automation to safely monitor the system for any errors, 
but still allow the system to perform its job and gain the benefits of the automated driving. Lee 
and See (2004) have defined human-automation trust as “the attitude that an agent will help 
achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability” (p. 
54). For the purposes of this study, the same definition will be used, emphasizing human trust in 
an automated system with uncertainties in the automation’s actions and vulnerabilities of the 
system to fail. The operator should trust that a system will accurately perform the job it is 
programmed to do in a real-world situation where the automation can fail with unpredictable 
consequences. 
Human-automation systems like semi-autonomous vehicles require both parties to work 
together for the system to function optimally (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Trust calibration 
allows human operators to balance his or her trust in the system with the actual capabilities of the 
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system (Lee & Moray, 1992). If a human driver distrusts the automation, he or she may be less 
likely to allow the automation to perform its intended function. In this case, the human may try 
to take over control from the automation early, or neglect to engage the automation entirely. 
Equally, a human driver might overtrust the automation, resulting in the human not being 
available to help or takeover when the automation requires so. Understanding the dimensions of 
trust in automation will allow designers to create systems that maximize human-automation 
collaboration, thus increasing safety. 
1.3.1 Dispositional Trust and Learned Trust. Everyone has certain innate factors that 
influence a person’s likelihood to trust an automated system (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). A person’s 
age, culture, gender, and personality traits can all affect the tendency to trust automation. 
Dispositional trust is this inborn propensity to trust that is relatively stable over time (Hoff & 
Bashir, 2015). In contrast, learned trust is trust that people have accrued over time through 
experience (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). Initial learned trust is the level of trust an individual has in a 
specific automated system, even if he or she has never used it before. Nearly all individuals 
experienced many types of automation, either through first-hand interaction with the automation, 
or through second-hand knowledge from media or friends. These experiences can shape an 
individual’s opinions about and future interactions with automation. Before measuring how a 
new automation system affects trust, it is important to understand and control for an individual’s 
dispositional and initial learned trust.  
1.3.2 Dynamically Learned Trust. Operators of automated machines build trust through 
experience with the system (Hoff & Bashir, 2015). Dynamically learned trust is affected by 
design features, system performance, and situational factors outside of the system (Hoff & 
Bashir, 2015). In contrast to dispositional trust and initial learned trust, dynamically learned trust 
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is built and adapted through interaction with an automation system. Over time, operators can 
understand the capabilities and limitations of the system and properly calibrate their trust 
accordingly. With a reliable automation system, the level of trust should increase to match an 
equivalent level of reliability (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Chen et al., 2018). Unfortunately, 
studies measuring the development of trust over multiple events are rare, with most simply 
administering pre- and post-experiment trust measures (but see Bliss et al., accepted).  
1.3.3 Trust decline due to error. When an automation error occurs, it is likely to reduce 
an operator’s trust in the system. This automation error is seen to decrease the reliability of the 
automation, thus making a user less likely to trust the automation to perform the task correctly 
(Hancock et al., 2011; Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Schaefer, Chen, 
Szalma, & Hancock, 2015). Automation errors are one of the most influential factors affecting 
trust, depending on the severity of the error. For minor errors, trust decrement might be small 
and inconsequential. However, major errors like a vehicle crash would be much more potent (de 
Visser, Pak, & Shaw, 2018). The decline of trust could hurt the performance of the human-
automation team if the level of trust does not rebound from the decrease.  
Both overreliance and disuse can result in suboptimal use of the system. Two potential 
results are errors of commission, in which a human operator can make action that is incorrect 
while following the suggestion of the automation, or omission, in which a human operator fails 
to act due to missing a signal by the automation (Parasuraman & Riley 1997). Errors of 
commission commonly occur in a reliance-oriented system in which the automation notifies the 
human of a need for action and the human must decide if the warning is legitimate. Errors of 
omission commonly occur in a compliance-oriented system in which the automation shows when 
the system is working normally, and the human must notice when a fault has occurred (Lee & 
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See, 2004). Automated driving systems currently occupy a space between reliance- and 
compliance-oriented systems because the human must pay attention to warnings and requests to 
takeover control, but they must also monitor the system for a failure of the automation recognize 
to recognize a hazard. The human driver’s trust level helps maintain the delicate balance between 
avoiding commission errors when reacting to potential warnings and avoiding omission errors 
when the automation fails to detect and avoid hazards. The amount of trust decline could depend 
on the type of system error and what was required from the human operator. 
1.3.4 Trust repair. de Visser et al. (2018) review different strategies for repairing trust 
after a system error. They argue that in the same way that the best human-human teams try to 
intentionally build rapport fix trust if any problems occur (Duhigg, 2016), human-automation 
teams should act similarly to promote the best performance of the system. There is limited work 
in the area of trust repair for human-automation systems; however, de Visser et al. appraised 
studies about trust repair and provide a list of several active trust repair strategies (e.g. apologize, 
deny, empathize, explain). These strategies seem to be promising, but many are new or require 
more testing. The authors provide a theoretical trajectory model showing how different strategies 
could repair trust over time and include a theoretical baseline recovery pattern. The trajectory 
shows fast declines directly after an error, and a slowly rising, stepped line for the baseline 
recovery (de Visser et al., 2018). The baseline recovery rate demonstrates how trust can recover 
over time without any intentional repair strategy. The baseline recovery pattern can provide 
theoretical evidence for how trust repair occurs without a repair strategy. This pattern can then be 
used to compare the effectiveness of alternative repair interventions. As of now, there has been 
little evidence of such repair trajectories and even de Visser et al. call on researchers to consider 
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trust repair for automation studies. As a result, evidence of trust repair is needed to help build the 
theoretical literature. 
1.4 Trust for Easy and Difficult Tasks 
 As mentioned before, many design aspects of automated systems can help ensure 
appropriate trust and reliance in automated systems. However, there are also external 
environmental factors that influence the system that can affect the human’s trust in the 
automation. Each driving experience can be very different. The road, traffic, setting, and dozens 
of other conditions can change for each drive and humans can perceive these differences and 
may change their behavior and actions to match (Fredrick et al., 2017). The human driver may 
deem some situations easy and believe that the automation should have no trouble. But in other 
situations, the human driver might understand that the situation is difficult for them and the 
automation might also have difficulty with the task. This difference in task difficulty could affect 
an individual’s level of trust in the automation and how they perceive and react to errors of the 
automation in these contexts. 
As the difficulty of a particular task changes, so can a human’s trust in automation. If an 
automated system is performing a difficult task, a human operator will account for the strengths 
and weaknesses of the system and respond accordingly (Madhavan et al., 2006). Madhavan et al. 
(2006) performed a study to measure the effects of automation failures on easy tasks. Their 
participants performed a target detection task in which they were told to identify target letters 
within an array of distractor letters. Some of the trials had small numbers of distractors making it 
easy, and other trials had many distractors to make it more difficult. They found that when 
automation made errors in a task that the operator perceives is easy, their trust was lower than the 
group with errors in a difficult task, they relied less on the automation, and their confidence 
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about their own ability increased (Madhavan et al., 2006). This finding falls in line with prior 
research (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003). The authors also stated that this 
effect of easy errors was likely due to two factors: conspicuity of automation errors in an easy 
task and the tendency of humans to have inflated ideas about their own ability when the task 
appears easy (Madhavan et al., 2006; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). A key 
point of note is that Madhavan et al. (2006) measured if the participant perceived the task as 
easy. If someone does not perceive a task as more easy or difficult than another, the finding is 
not likely to be shown.  
 The task that Madhavan et al. (2006) used was a basic target detection task that they 
reasoned was similar to baggage screening. However, the basic nature of letter discrimination 
cannot always be readily applied to the real-world and might not translate well to more complex 
tasks. Dzindolet et al. (2003) had a conceptually similar task that involved spotting a 
camouflaged soldier in a photograph of a nature scene. These studies both demonstrated humans 
and automation can have different performance for the same task and the difficulty of the task 
can influence the human’s perception of the capabilities of the automated system. Because task 
difficulty has been shown to affect trust, it is important to expand this finding and test it in an 
applied setting. This way, it can help inform real-world design because automation might need to 
behave differently according to the current context. 
The way Madhavan et al. (2006) tested trust differences was through direct manipulation 
of the complexity of the task. The task incorporated more or less targets, thus making the targets 
easier or harder to find and increasing required search time. They were able to quantifiably 
change the difficulty of the task by having either 5 targets out of 1000 stimuli or 90 targets out of 
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1000. They can attach a number to how many targets they changed, but it might not be a linear 
relationship in task-difficulty change. Thus, quantifying relative difficulty is challenging. 
A task can also be made more difficult by changing the scene, setting, or scenario. The 
target detection task could be made more difficult by dimming the screen to obscure the 
readability of the letters or obscuring the periphery of vision so that the participant could only 
see what was in the fovea. A lighting manipulation for difficulty could be quantified similar to 
critical target decreases by decreasing lighting levels by a specific percentage or restricting the 
field of view by a specific amount. The key difference between these two manipulations is that 
Madhavan et al. (2006) changed the aspect of task itself to make it more difficult, whereas an 
alternative approach is to change the scene, setting, or environment to change the difficulty of 
the task. To simplify and clarify the idea for the rest of the document, the term “lighting 
condition” will be used to refer to daytime and nighttime that could affect the difficulty of a task. 
The change in lighting condition is a new concept from that of previous research and will 
contribute to previous theory by expanding the idea of what could make a task easy or difficult. 
1.5 Current Study 
Current literature has examined the development of trust in automation and the factors 
that influence it. However, little research has been done to investigate the effect of driving 
condition, particularly in applied scenarios like semi-autonomous driving where trust is 
developed over time. Prior studies have examined trust with takeover scenarios, but only 
investigated how trust changed from before one drive with a TOR to after that experience (Gold, 
Körber, Hohenberger, Lechner, & Bengler, 2015; Hergeth, Lorenz, Krems, & Toenert, 2015). 
Other research has found that when an automated aid makes errors in an easy task it leads to 
more distrust than when an automated aid makes errors in a difficult task (Madhavan et al., 
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2006). Additionally, Madhavan et al. found that automation reliance is more likely with highly 
reliable automation for a difficult task. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how different lighting conditions could 
affect users’ trust levels in the automation in response to realistic automation failures. The study 
examined how trust is built over time and the effect that automation failure has on the human 
driver’s trust. The study expanded trust development over time by getting trust ratings after each 
of the seven drives. This way, the building, decline, and repair of trust was observed within the 
experiment, in contrast to typical pre/post trust differences which do not show growth or decline 
patterns. The study also developed the theory behind how trust is affected when automation fails 
in daytime and nighttime conditions as a proxy for easy versus difficult driving conditions. 
Participants were asked to rate drive difficulty in an attempt to quantify differences between the 
daytime and nighttime conditions. By examining this phenomenon in an applied context, it 
further demonstrated how this critical difference can cause unique changes in the development of 
trust, leading to design recommendations for autonomous vehicle developers. 
Three separate types of automation were used to properly assess trust in a realistic 
scenario. A no error (perfect baseline) condition, a TOR condition (one take-over request) and an 
automation failure condition (no warning/takeover request) were tested to examine if different 
automation errors could affect trust, especially when lighting conditions were different. 
Participants engaged in seven simulated drives with trust ratings collected after each drive to 
assess their development of trust over time. The no error condition showed how trust was 
normally developed over time in the scenario. This perfect baseline was necessary for 
understanding how errors in the other two conditions affect trust. The TOR and automation 
failure showed how trust declined for an unreliable system. Additionally, testing two different 
   
 
14 
automation errors was helpful because both problems represent realistic situations that occur in 
real-world driving. However, these errors focus on different causes of the automation failure and 
require different actions from the human driver. For a TOR, the automation understands its 
limitations and requests a takeover by the human driver (not a miss), whereas in the automation 
failure condition, the human driver must take over control because they have noticed a problem 
that the automation has missed. The six experimental groups in the study are shown in Table 1. 
 








Group 1 Day No Error 21 
Group 2 Day TOR 21 
Group 3 Day Failure 21 
Group 4 Night No Error 17 
Group 5 Night TOR 21 
Group 6 Night Failure 21 
Note. TOR = Takeover Request. 
Separate drives allowed the participant to experience the capabilities of the system over 
various scenario and unique experiences. A problem with some lab-based studies is the lack of 
real-world validity due to a short timeframe for experience with the automation in single-session 
studies (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996). In this study, instead of using 
one single drive with only a pre- and post-drive trust measure, multiple drives allowed for 
measuring trust development after each drive over time. Even though this study was still 
completed in a single session, the multiple drives with trust measures still showed development 
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over time. Thus, the design allowed investigation into the dynamics of building trust, reducing 
trust after an incident, and then possible trust recovery. 
Previous studies have implemented a multiple-drive framework to test take-over request 
related questions (Naujoks, Mai, & Neukum, 2014; Van Der Heiden, Iqbal, & Janssen, 2017; 
Walch et al., 2015; Zeeb, Buchner, & Schrauf, 2015, 2016). Additionally, most of these studies 
took around 30-45 minutes to complete the driving portion. For the current study, the total 
driving time was about 40 minutes, fitting well within the range of the other studies. All the 
drives had common features that could be seen in normal, everyday drives, such as traffic lights 
and merging cars. These common features, listed in Table 2, are all events that could potentially 
be hazardous and cause a crash if the situation is not handled properly. Presenting several 
hazards forced participants to make sure the driving automation system safely avoids each one. 
However, for this study, only the construction hazard on the three-minute-long fourth drive) was 
the critical to maintain consistency.  
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Trust repair can be improved in various ways (de Visser et al., 2018); however this study 
did not use a specific active repair strategy. Trust repair through only perfect trials demonstrates 
a theoretical baseline without an active repair method. When a trust repair baseline is established, 
later improvements and approaches can be compared. For now, most automation systems do not 
have advanced trust repair strategies, so testing the basic method of repair is currently most 
useful.  
Trust and usefulness are likely highly correlated constructs. However, usefulness can 
demonstrate a more direct application of how likely participants would be to use of the system 
outside of the experimental setting. After the participant is done with all the drives, a Usefulness 
of Automation Survey (UAS) based on Gold et al. (2015) captured how likely they are to want to 
use this system. Their level of trust in the system is important, but the UAS further clarified the 
participant’s perceived safety gain by using the automation and how much they would intend to 
use the system afterwards (Gold et al., 2015). 
1.6 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Ratings of task difficulty should be lower for the daytime condition than 
for the nighttime condition. Nighttime driving is objectively more difficult than daytime driving 
due to visual problems associated with low luminance, which can lead to increased reaction 
times and slower object recognition (Konstantopoulos et al., 2010; Leibowitz & Owens, 1977; 
Plainis & Murray, 2002).  
Hypothesis 2a: Trust in automation in the daytime and nighttime no error conditions was 
expected to be equivalent. Previous research by Madhavan et al. (2006) and Dzindolet et al. 
(2003) showed that highly reliable automation showed no trust differences, regardless of 
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difficulty. Participant’s trust diverged only when the automation made errors in easy and difficult 
condition in previous studies. Therefore, with no error, there should be no differences in trust.  
Hypothesis 2b: The daytime trust was expected to be lower than nighttime trust for the 
TOR and Automation Failure conditions because the daytime task is perceived as easier. The 
perceived error on drive 4 should reduce participant trust. If Hypothesis 1 is not supported, this 
hypothesis would not be expected because the differences in trust in Madhavan et al. (2006), 
Dzindolet et al. (2003), and Schwark, Dolgov, Graves, and Hor (2012) are only found when 
participants perceive a task to be difficult. 
Hypothesis 2c: An interaction was expected, such that the daytime condition has a larger 
decrease in trust than nighttime, and that difference is even greater in the failure condition than 
the TOR condition. This prediction was based on results in Madhavan et al. (2006) and 
Dzindolet et al. (2003). Failures in an easy task show greater decreases of trust than failures in a 
difficult task. TORs are a less extreme type of error, so they should have less of an effect. 
Similar to Hypothesis 2b, this interaction would not be expected if Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported. 
Hypothesis 3: Level of trust was expected to increase as the number of drives increases, 
but then drop after the takeover event in the TOR condition and the Automation Failure 
condition, with a larger drop in trust for the Automation Failure. Trust was also expected to 
recover to higher levels after subsequent drives after the takeover event (de Visser et al., 2018).  
Hypothesis 4: Subjective assessment of usefulness via the UAS should yield a result 
pattern similar to trust in automation, such that, a significant main effect of error type was 
expected for UAS. This hypothesis was based on Hoff and Bashir (2015) because an errorless 
system should be more useful and trustworthy than one that produces errors.  
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Hypothesis 5a: The main effects of lighting condition and automation error type were 
expected to be significant. RT was expected to be faster for the TOR condition than for the 
failure condition, and RT in the daytime condition was expected to be faster than that in the 
nighttime condition. This would not be a new finding because warnings have been well 
established to improve RT (Porter, Irani, & Mondor, 2008; Ruscio, Ciceri, & Biassoni, 2015; 
Xiang, Yan, Weng, & Li, 2016). However, it helps to demonstrate the magnitude of the 
differences between groups, which is important for comparison with other research to help 
inform designers.  
Hypothesis 5b: Accuracy was expected to follow the same pattern as described in 
Hypothesis 5a. Accuracy would be better for the TOR condition than for the Automation Failure 
condition. Because the participant would be warned about the upcoming critical event in the 










The study employed a 2 (Lighting Condition: Daytime, Nighttime) x 3 (Automation Error 
Type: No Error, TOR, and Failure) x 7 (Drive number: Drive 1-7) mixed design. Lighting 
condition and automation error type were manipulated between subjects and drive number was 
manipulated within subjects.  
2.1.1 Independent Variables. There were three independent variables in this study. The 
first was lighting condition. The daytime and nighttime conditions represented the difficulty of 
the task, easy and difficult, respectively. The daytime setting was used as the easy condition 
because all potential hazards could be clearly seen from the instant they appeared on the horizon. 
The nighttime setting was more difficult because it obscured the hazards, not allowing the driver 
to fully see the entire scene until the objects were closer (Konstantopoulos, Chapman, & 
Crundall, 2010).  
The second independent variable was the automation error type. There were three 
automation error types: no error, TOR, and failure. For all three conditions, a critical 
construction hazard appeared in the driver’s lane during the fourth drive. The hazard required 
moving to the left-hand lane to avoid a collision. See Figure 3 for images of the critical 
construction hazard. The automation responded to the critical hazard in three different ways, 
depending on the condition. First, in the no error condition, the automation had no errors and 
thus this condition served as the baseline. The second condition had a standard TOR during 
which the automation issued a three-beep warning telling the participant to take over control. 
The TOR was issued as soon as the hazard could be seen, about 480 feet from the hazard. In the 
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last condition, automation failure, the automation failed to notice and avoid the critical road 
hazard, and thus the participants were required to notice it and manually take over control. Both 
the TOR and automation failure conditions demonstrate realistic scenarios that happen during 
current autonomous car operation (Brown & Laurier, 2017; Endsley, 2017). Trust should be 
affected differently for these two groups because even though they both fail to perform, the TOR 
still provides a warning (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Parasuraman et al., 1997; Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997; Walch, Lange, Baumann, & Weber, 2015).  
Both the lighting condition and error type condition were manipulated between subjects 
to avoid participants being exposed to an error more than once. There were six groups with about 
20 participants tested in each group (see Table 1). Participants were randomly assigned to a 
daytime or a nighttime condition and randomly assigned to either no error, TOR, or failure 
conditions. Random assignment of participants was carried out in blocks of 12 so that two 
participants were in each of the six conditions for every 12 experimental sessions. Random 
assignment helped to ensure participants were evenly assigned to groups and that each condition 
was filled consistently throughout the data collection period. The random assignment was 
determined to be successful after conducting separate 2 (Lighting condition: Daytime, 
Nighttime) x 3 (Error type: No Error, TOR, Failure) Analyses of Variances between all groups 
for age, gender, driving experience, pre-drive trust, or ADOS ratings, respectively. No significant 
differences were found between groups using a p = .05 cutoff. 
No Error. The no error condition featured automation that committed no errors and did 
not require the participant to take over control. The participant was required to have his or her 
hands on the wheel and foot on the pedal to be ready to respond at any point. As a result, 
although participants did not have to intervene, they were still required to attend to the drive.  
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TOR. For the TOR condition, the automation noticed the critical hazard and issued a 
TOR. The TOR consisted of a 1000-hz sinusoidal earcon (as used by Borojeni, Chuang, Heuten, 
& Boll, 2016) to signal the request. The participant needed to take over manual control of the 
vehicle after receiving this request to avoid crashing. The auditory warning was presented about 
six seconds before the critical event to give the driver a short warning before the event. Previous 
research has shown that a two-second transition time is not sufficient for a driver to resume 
control, but five seconds should be enough (Mok et al., 2015). Other studies have confirmed that 
5-7 seconds is sufficient (De Winter et al., 2014; Gold, Damböck, Lorenz, & Bengler, 2013). A 
review of driver takeover times in automated vehicles has shown that one of the most commonly 
used TOR lead times has been 3 seconds with a mean takeover reaction time of 1.14 seconds 
(Eriksson & Stanton, 2017). However, the present experiment also included an automation 
failure that required more time for participants to realize they needed to take over because the 
automation was not working. Pilot testing of the experiment showed that 6 seconds was enough 
time in both conditions, similar to the forewarning provided by De Winter et al. (2014) and Gold 
et al. (2013). The 6-second time to contact (TTC) gave participants enough time to handle the 
critical event while also leaving a potential for crashes if responses were not fast enough. 
Automation Failure. In the automation failure condition, the automation did not make an 
appropriate avoidance behavior for the critical event. Moreover, it did not signal the driver about 
the issue as in the TOR condition but continued as if there was no hazard, resulting in a crash if 
the driver did not adjust. It was solely up to the driver to notice the problem and correct for the 
issue. 
Drives and Critical Event. Participants encountered seven separate drives with all but 
one of the drives lasting about five to six minutes each. The fourth drive was three minutes long 
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because a critical hazard event happened at the end of that drive, approximating the midpoint of 
the other 6 drives. The critical hazard was a construction zone in the driver’s lane, requiring the 
vehicle to change lanes to avoid crashing. For the TOR condition, the automation issued a TOR 
and the automation failure condition gave no warning but continued toward the hazard with an 
approximate 6-second TTC. In the no error condition the car successfully navigated around the 
critical hazard. The drive ended directly after the critical hazard event. The critical hazard event 
occurred at three minutes to provide participants enough time to acclimate to the drive but 
prevented them from expecting something to happen at the end of the drive. The fourth drive was 
chosen because it was the middle drive and would allow data collection showing if trust 
improved before the critical event and if trust recovered afterward. The first three drives should 
show increases in trust due to experience with the system. The fourth drive should lower trust 
because of the need for takeover. Then the final three drives could show either continued low 
trust or repair of trust on the subsequent errorless drives. 
Each drive was designed to be unique, with different locations, building, objects, and 
potential hazards. Although the drives were unique, they all contained a similar number of about 
five potential hazard events and an attempt was made to equate them all for interest and 
difficulty. The goal was to make participants feel like each drive was like a normal trip they 
would take to different locations.  
2.1.2 Dependent Variables. The objective dependent measures were accuracy (whether 
the participant safely avoided crashing in the TOR or automation failure conditions), RT (First 
response of at least 1 degree turn of steering wheel from event onset/Braking action). Subjective 
dependent measures were the subjective Human-Computer Trust questionnaire (Appendix D) 
based on Madsen and Gregor (2000), the Automated Driving Opinion Survey (ADOS), including 
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driving experience questions (Appendix C), based on Kyriakidis, Happee, and De Winter  
(2015), the Usefulness of Automation Survey (UAS; Appendix E) based on Gold et al. (2015). 
Demographic information was collected via a demographic questionnaire (Appendix B). 
Participants completed the trust questionnaire eight times, once after the practice demonstration 
and each of the drives. All measures are further described in Section 2.3 Measures. 
2.2 Participants 
I conducted an a priori power analysis with Power Analysis and Sample Size (PASS) 
software (https://www.ncss.com/software/pass/) using the mixed models simulation to estimate a 
desired sample size for the current study (Appendix A). Using a 2 (A: Lighting Condition) x 3 
(B: Error Type) x 7 (C: Drive) mixed design with the A and B terms as between-groups and C as 
within-groups, the software performed 100 simulations to estimate the power of an N of 90, 120, 
and 150. Results showed that an N of about 120 would provide over 80% power for the A, C, 
AxC, BxC, and AxBxC factors and interactions. However, the B factor and AxB interactions 
were estimated lower at about 50% and 60% power, respectively. Although the power was 
expected to be lower for B and AxB, the power only rose to about 65% with an N of 150. 
Because of diminishing returns for increasing the N, and balancing the time and resources of the 
lab, I decided that an N of 120 would be sufficient to find most of the desired effects. However, 
the potential for underpowered factors and Type II error should be considered with any non-
significant results found in the study.  
As a result, 133 participants were recruited for the study. However, 11 of those 
participants were excluded from the study due to issues with data collection caused by simulator 
crashes or data collection errors. The remaining122 participants (84 female and 38 male) yielded 
about 20 participants in each of the six groups (see Table 1). The participants were required to 
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have a valid driver’s license and reported that their average driving experience was 3.73 (SD = 
1.23) years and had a mean age of 19.57 (SD = 3.00). The participants’ ethnicities were 
Caucasian (41), African American (63), Asian (6), and more than one race (12). All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal hearing and vision. Participants were undergraduate 
psychology students recruited from Old Dominion University’s SONA (odupsychology.sona-
systems.com) pool. They were given class credits for their time. 
2.3 Apparatus and Stimuli 
The participants faced a table mounted computer display and steering wheel (Logitech 
G920 driving Force). Three pedals were at their feet (clutch, brake, accelerator, from left to right 
respectively). The clutch was not used because the vehicle had automatic transition (see Figure 
1). A Dell P2717H 27-inch monitor with a 1920x1080 resolution was used to display the driving 
environment. The participants sat approximately 32 inches from the screen resulting in a 
horizontal visual angle of about 45.75° (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Logitech G920 racing wheel and pedals used in the experiment 
(https://www.logitechg.com/en-us/product/g920-driving-force) 
 




Figure 2. The setup of the driving simulator from the view of the participant. 
 
2.3.1 STISIM. The driving simulation software used was STISIM (stisimdrive.com) 
driving simulator software, version 3.14.02. Daytime driving occurred with lighting parameters 
set to replicate daylight conditions (100% ambient, 50% diffuse, 25% specular). From the 
STISIM manual, “Ambient specifies how intense or bright the light will be, diffuse specifies how 
much shadowing there will be on non-lit surfaces, and specular specifies how shiny an object 
appears”. The daytime values were set to default. Nighttime driving occurred with lighting 
parameters set to replicate nighttime conditions (25% ambient, 0% diffuse, 0% specular). These 
values are those specified in the manual for a nighttime driving scenario. For nighttime driving, 
the car’s simulated headlights were turned on. No specific information on headlight lighting 
levels was given in the manual, but the headlights are meant to replicate realistic driving. The 
headlights shined on the road directly in front of the vehicle, allowing for adequate vision for 
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objects within a short span of the front of the vehicle, but more obscured vision further out. See 




Figure 3. Screenshots of the construction hazard for both lighting conditions. Daytime is on the 
left and Nighttime is on the right. The construction hazard first visible for the top images and 
fully visible in the bottom images. 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Demographics. A basic demographics sheet (see Appendix B) was used to gather 
demographic and handedness information about the participants to report distributions of gender, 
age, race, and handedness. 
2.4.2 Automated Driving Opinion Survey (ADOS). This survey was used to gather 
manual driving experience, automated driving experience, and opinions about automated 
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vehicles from each of the participants. Automated driving experience was not expected to show 
much variability but was included to help control for the potential that some participants might 
be experienced with automated driving. The survey was adapted from Kyriakidis et al.’s (2015) 
survey but was modified to use only questions about driver behavior and attitudes about 
automated vehicles. The authors used the survey to investigate public opinions about automated 
driving across many cultures. Therefore, the original survey contained many unrelated questions, 
including income, disability, personality, willingness to pay for automated driving systems, data 
privacy concerns, country of origin, and computer usage. Therefore, the current study included 
23 of the original 41 questions related to manual and automated driving behaviors and opinions. 
This scale was administered to participants at the beginning of the experiment so that experience 
with the system did not influence responses (see Appendix C). 
2.4.3 Trust in Automation Scale. Trust is often measured via the subjective Human-
Computer Trust questionnaire developed by Madsen and Gregor (2000). The measure asks 
various questions to assess five key aspects of trust: personal attachment, reliability, 
understandability, technical competence, and faith. Madsen and Gregor refined and validated the 
scales, finding that the understandability, reliability, faith, and personal attachment scales 
demonstrated good scale reliability, Cronbach’s alpha = .84, .85, .88, and .90, respectively. The 
perceived technical competence scale fared the worst with Cronbach’s alpha equal to .74, 
although it is still considered acceptable. The authors stated that the wording for the technical 
competence questions may have been hard for participants to clearly understand, so some 
phrasing changes could be necessary. A principal components analysis for the single factor 
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human-computer trust conducted by Madsen and Gregor demonstrated that all questions were 
highly correlated with human-computer trust. 
Participants in the present study were asked to fill out a Human-Computer Trust 
questionnaire adapted from the scale designed by Madsen and Gregor (2000) after each of the 
seven drives. The scale included 24 questions that assess human-automation trust based on five 
separate criteria to encompass the multi-dimensional aspects of trust. Madsen and Gregor 
determined that the question, “The system correctly uses the information I enter”, would improve 
the scale reliability if it was removed. Therefore, the current study replaced that question with an 
attention check requiring the participant to mark a specific answer specified by the experimenter. 
Minor phrasing modifications were made to the questions to make them relevant to an automated 
driving task. Additionally, participants were told that, “This survey sometimes uses language 
like, ‘actions’, ‘decision’, and ‘problem’. Please interpret these in the context of the driving 
automation system. 'Problems' are potential hazards on the road, 'actions' are movements that the 
vehicle makes, and 'decisions' are actions taken in response to problems where multiple different 
actions could be made”. The researcher was always present to make sure participants clearly 
understood what the questionnaire was asking. Questions were rated on a Likert scale from 1 
(“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Examples of questions are, “I can rely on the 
system to function properly” and “I believe actions from the automated driving system are safe 
even when I don’t know for certain that it is correct.” By administering the scale after each drive, 
it allowed a dynamic understanding of trust, showing initial trust, how each drive changes trust, 
and then a final overall rating of trust for the automated driving system (see Appendix D). 
2.4.4 Perceived Difficulty Rating. Participants rated the drive difficulty after each drive. 
Participants were asked, “How would you rate the ease or difficulty of performing this drive?”. 
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They responded using a Likert scale from 1-7 (extremely easy-extremely difficult). Perceived 
drive difficulty ratings helped to demonstrate if there were distinctions between different drives, 
lighting conditions, and automation error types. 
2.4.5 Usefulness of Automated System (UAS). Based on the survey administered by 
Gold et al. (2015), participants completed the Usefulness of Automation System survey after all 
seven drives had been completed. The survey asked about perceived discharge of the driver due 
to automation (how much the driver believed they could let the automation do the task for them), 
safety gain from the automation, hazards to safety caused by the automation, perceived control of 
conduct, and intention of use. The five individual sections will be collectively referred to as 
Usefulness if the Automated System (UAS) for simplicity. All these categories were analyzed 
together to see if there were differences among the independent variables. The UAS helped 
verify the practical application and potential use for each of the systems (see Appendix E). 
2.5 Procedure 
Participants were greeted and welcomed into the lab at their scheduled times. Each 
participant sat in a non-rolling chair in front of the driving simulator. He or she was encouraged 
to adjust the position of the chair to comfortably reach the wheel and pedals. Each participant 
read and signed an informed consent form. Next, participants provided demographic information 
about themselves (Appendix B). Participants then completed the ADOS to get information about 
their driving experiences and opinions about automated driving (Appendix C). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the six experimental groups. Participants were then given 
instructions for the following tasks and then completed each task. See Figure 4 for a graphical 
representation of the procedure. 




Figure 4. The experiment procedure. The experiment started with the green rectangle (ADOS) 
and followed the arrows to end at the red rectangle (UAS). 
2.5.1 Practice Task. The practice session had two phases. The first was about 1.5 
minutes long and required manual driving (automatic gearbox, but not autonomous vehicle) to 
familiarize the participant with the simulator. The next phase required about 1.5 minutes of 
automated driving to familiarize the participant with the behaviors of the automated driving. This 
second phase was a demonstration of the automation’s capabilities, so participants could become 
familiar with how the system works. Participants were required to have their hands on the wheel 
and their feet on the pedals during the experiment. This reflected the requirements of Level 2 
driving automation systems that require the driver to be engaged and ready to take control at any 
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time (SAE, 2016). It also helped capture consistent reaction times (Greenlee, DeLucia, & 
Newton, 2018).  
The automated practice section ended with a forced takeover so that the participants 
could become familiar with the takeover process. The takeover process used an ambiguous 
earcon (1000hz sinusoidal tone, as used in Borojeni, Chuang, Heuten, & Boll, 2016; Naujoks, 
Mai, & Neukum, 2014) to alert the driver that he or she would be taking control of the vehicle. 
There was no critical event associated with the practice takeover, because it could prime the 
participant for a hazard later in the experiment. Participants were explicitly told that this is a 
training scenario to show them what a TOR could look like and to give them experience with 
automation. The experimenter pointed out exactly when the TOR would occur and told 
participants that they were now in full manual control of the vehicle again and could switch lanes 
or maneuver however they wanted until the drive ended in about 25 seconds. Participants could 
voluntarily repeat the practice section if they did not get a proper understanding of the simulator 
or the situation. However, it was not necessary for anyone to repeat the practice. 
2.5.2 Experimental Task. For the experimental task, the participant was told to maintain 
concentration on the driving environment and be prepared for the small chance that the vehicle 
could issue a Takeover Request. Participants were not told a specific percentage chance for 
likelihood of a TOR. Instead, participants were able to see how the automation functioned in the 
demonstration and could develop an estimate of their own. The initial learned trust was measured 
to help account for individual differences. Automotive companies do not tell consumers a true 
reliability percentage for any autonomous functions of their vehicle. The users typically must 
find this out for themselves or other sources like friends and media. Reliability data are hard to 
accurately collect for current commercial vehicles. It requires numerous user reports, because 
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companies could not feasibly test drive the required number of miles to demonstrate reliability 
rates (Kalra & Paddock, 2016). To simulate more realistic and accurate trust calibration, 
participants saw the automation demonstration and were assessed on their preconceived trust.  
The participants completed all seven drives as explained in the design for the drive and 
critical event phases. After each drive they completed the Human-Computer Trust Questionnaire 
(Appendix D), with the appended perceived drive difficulty question. Participants were told to 
rate the automated driving system as a whole, incorporating all of the drives together, not 
individually. After completing the drives, participants filled out the Usefulness of Automation 
Scale (Appendix E). Once they completed the questionnaires and drives, they were thanked for 
their time, granted credit, and escorted out of the lab. 
 
  





3.1 Subjective Drive Difficulty 
 Participants estimated subjective drive difficulty on a scale on 1-7 (Extremely easy – 
Extremely difficult) after each drive. Difficulty was analyzed using a 2x3x7 mixed factor 
ANOVA with lighting condition and error type as the between-subjects IVs, and drive number as 
the within-subjects IV. The difficulty ratings were not significantly different between daytime 
and nighttime conditions F(1, 116) = 1.33, p = .251, ηp2 = .01, which contrasts the expected 
differences in perceived difficulty stated in Hypothesis 1. The failure to support Hypothesis 1 
indicates that Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c would no longer be expected. This expectation is 
demonstrated in Section 3.2 (Subjective Trust). 
Difficulty ratings were significantly different for error conditions F(1, 116) = 6.26, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .10. Specifically, the failure condition had significantly higher ratings of difficulty 
than both the TOR, t(116) = 2.46, p = .04, and no error conditions, t(116) = 3.42, p = .002. The 
difference between TOR and no error was not significant, t(116) = 1.02, p = .565. The main 
effect of drive was significant, F(1, 116) = 7.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, and planned contrast showed 
that drive 4 had significantly higher ratings of drive difficulty than the other drives F(1, 116) = 
26.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. Results seem to indicate that participants rated the difficulty of the 
drive based on how the automation performed, rather than considering the lighting conditions of 
the drive. See Figure 5 for graph showing difficulty for each drive separated by error type. 




Figure 5. Subjective difficulty for each drive. Each line represents a different error type 
condition. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.2 Subjective Trust 
 Trust was analyzed first by demonstrating no difference between all conditions for pre-
drive trust. This was done to ensure no groups started at a different level of dispositional and 
initial learned trust. Then, trust was analyzed across drives 1-7 to document trust growth or 
decline patterns. After the discussion of overall trust findings below, specific findings for 
dynamically learned trust, decline of trust, and trust repair were addressed. Dynamically learned 
trust was discussed separately from the other sections because, as expected, no differences were 
found between groups, so they were collapsed and analyzed together. 
 3.2.1 Pre-drive Trust. The pre-drive trust measure, taken after the participants 
participated in practice and saw the demonstration of the automation’s capabilities, was intended 
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to measure their dispositional trust, specifically for the automated vehicle. Because participants 
may vary concerning their comprehension of automation, the demonstration was meant to clarify 
how participants would understand what automation was in this experiment. We also wanted to 
ensure that participants’ later ratings of trust related to their baseline initial learned trust ratings. 
 Pre-drive trust was analyzed using a 2x3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with lighting 
condition (daytime, nighttime) and error type (no error, TOR, failure) as independent variables. 
Neither the main effects nor the interaction was significant, Fs <1. Equivalency testing using two 
one-sided t-tests (TOST) was used to verify equivalence among the six groups. All compared 
groups’ 95% confidence interval for equivalence was within the equivalence interval of [-.5, .5], 
ps < .05, meaning a claim of equivalence is supported. Table 3 shows the results of the t tests 
with the greater of the two p values listed for each group comparison. Daytime and nighttime 
groups was also equivalent, t(58) = 3.32, p = .001. 
 
Table 3. Results of the TOST showing the greater of the two p values for each comparison.  
 
None TOR Failure 
None - t(41) = 2.01, p = .024 t(41) = 3.17, p = .001 
TOR t(41) = 2.01, p = .024 - t(41) = 1.76, p = .041 
Failure t(41) = 3.17, p = .001 t(41) = 1.76, p = .041 - 
 
 The Automated Driving Opinion Survey (ADOS) was compared to pre-drive trust to see 
if preconceived opinions about automated driving matched with trust in the automation after the 
demonstration. TOST was used to check equivalency and the 95% confidence interval for 
equivalence was within the equivalence interval of [-.5, .5], ps < .05, supporting a claim of 
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equivalence. This finding demonstrates that the automation demonstration did not significantly 
change trust levels from previously held opinions of automated vehicles. 
 3.2.2 Overall Trust – Drives 1-7. To test Hypothesis 3 which expected overall trust 
across the seven drives to rise through the first 3 drives, decrease for the critical drive 4, and to 
repair for the final 3 drives, a 2x3x7 mixed factor ANOVA was used with lighting condition and 
error type as the between-subjects IVs, and Drive Number as the within-subjects IV (see Figure 
6). Results showed that participants’ average trust ratings varied across the drives, F(6, 115) = 
6.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. A trend analysis was used to analyze the overall pattern of trust using 
within-groups polynomial contrasts. The analysis revealed a significant cubic trend, 
demonstrating an upward trend through the first three drives, a downward trend for drive 4, and 
then an upward trend for the final 3 drives, F(1, 116) = 13.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. There was also 
a significant main effect of error type, F(2, 116) = 4.56, p = .012, ηp2 = .07. Planned contrast 
showed that participants in the no error condition were significantly more trusting than those in 
the TOR condition, t(116) = 2.77, p = .006, and in the failure condition, t(116) = 2.44, p = .016. 
The difference between TOR and failure was not significant, t(116) = .34, p = .734. There was 
also a significant interaction between drive and error type, F(12, 696) = 3.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. 
This interaction resulted from the decline of trust in drive 4, and the slow repair in subsequent 
drives. 
The results support Hypothesis 3, demonstrating dynamically learned trust, decline of 
trust due to errors, and trust repair over time. The development of trust was one of the major foci 
of the study, so the analyses are split into the Dynamically Learned Trust, Trust in drive 4, and 
Trust Repair sections. The main effect of lighting condition was not significant, F(1, 116) = .54, 
p = .466, ηp2 = .01. The interaction between drive and lighting condition was not significant, F(6, 
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696) = 1.90, p = .079, ηp2 = .02, nor was the 3-way interaction among drive, lighting condition, 
and error type, F(12, 696) = 1.58, p = .093, ηp2 = .03. A Pearson correlation between overall trust 
and overall difficulty showed a significant negative correlation, r(122) = -.20, p = .027.  
 
 
Figure 6. Trust for all seven drives. Each line represents a different error type condition. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 3.2.3 Dynamically Learned Trust. Pre-drive trust and trust for drives 1-3 were analyzed 
using a 2x3x4 mixed-factors ANOVA with lighting condition and error type as between-subjects 
conditions and drive as the within-subjects factor. This separate analysis was conducted to 
examine dynamically learned trust before the critical event in drive 4. Trust was not significantly 
different across error types, F(2, 116) = 1.53, p = .221, ηp2 = .03, or between the two lighting 
conditions, F(1, 116) = .04, p = .835, ηp2 < .01. As per Hypotheses 2a and 3, this result was 
expected for error type because at this point, no error intervention had occurred. Lighting 
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condition was also not expected to show differences until drive 4, where the error could affect 
their trust due to perceived difficulty differences. Because between-groups comparisons were not 
significantly different, they were merged to examine dynamically learned trust. After merging, a 
repeated-measures ANOVA for drive showed that trust was significantly different as a function 
of drive number F(3, 363) = 7.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. A trend analysis showed a significant 
positive linear trend with trust increasing from pre-drive to drive 3, F(1, 116) = 15.09, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .12. This result supports Hypothesis 3, which expected a positive trend for trust as the 




Figure 7. Initial learned trust and trust at drives 1-3. All conditions were collapsed together. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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3.2.4 Trust in Drive 4. There was a significant effect of error type for trust after the 
critical fourth drive, F(2, 116) = 9.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. The effect of lighting condition was 
not significant, F(1, 116) = .07, p = .795, ηp2 = .01. Pairwise comparisons showed that trust was 
significantly higher for no error than TOR, t(116) = 2.99, p = .003, and Failure, t(116) = 4.16, p 
< .001. However, TOR and Failure were not significantly different, t(116) = 1.21, p = .229. 
These results partially supported Hypothesis 3. Trust was expected to stay constant for no error 
and decrease for TOR and failure in drive 4. However, because TOR is a warning, it was 
expected to decrease trust less than a complete automation failure.  
3.2.5 Trust Repair. Further analysis using a 2x3x4 mixed ANOVA for between-subjects 
lighting condition, error type and within-subjects drives 4-7 was conducted to demonstrate how 
trust could be repaired over time after additional errorless drives. There was a significant main 
effect of error type F(2, 116) = 6.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Pairwise comparisons showed that trust 
was higher through all drives for the no error condition than the TOR condition, t(116) = 3.15, p 
= .002, and the Failure condition, t(116) = 3.36, p = .001. This finding supported Hypothesis 3 
because there was no decrease of trust during drive 4 in the no error condition and thus 
maintained the same level for no error, and it was still low in the TOR and failure condition. 
There was no significant difference between TOR and failure, t(116) = .21, p = .830. Because 
TOR and failure were not statistically different, they were collapsed together to evaluate the 
baseline repair rate after a critical error. Using a repeated measures ANOVA for drives 4-7, it 
showed a main effect of drive, F(3, 249) = 6.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. A trend analysis showed a 
positive linear trend for trust increasing from drive 4 to drive 7, F(1, 116) = 13.44, p < .001, ηp2 
= .14. This result partially supports Hypothesis 3, demonstrating trust repair directly after an 
automation error when the automation performs perfectly. However, the magnitude of trust 
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rating increase after drive 5 is not very large, indicating that the repair is slow. See Figure 8 for 
graph of trust repair after a critical event for the combined TOR and failure conditions. 
 
 
Figure 8. Trust repair after a critical event in drive 4 with TOR and failure condition merged. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.3 Performance Measures - Drive 4 
Performance measures included accuracy and RT in response to the critical construction 
hazard in Drive 4. Accuracy was defined by whether the participant safely avoided crashing in 
the TOR and automation failure conditions, and RT was recorded from event onset to first 
response of 1-degree wheel turn or braking action. Accuracy and RT were not analyzed for the 
no error condition because there was no crash in that condition, thus no data were available to 
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analyze. Recall that Hypothesis 5 predicted the TOR condition to be faster and more accurate 
than the failure condition, and daytime to be faster and more accurate than nighttime. To test this 
hypothesis, a 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted with lighting condition (daytime 
and nighttime), and Automation Error Type (TOR, and Automation Failure).  
3.3.1 Accuracy. Accuracy was analyzed using a binary logistic regression to ascertain 
the effects of daytime or nighttime lighting conditions, TOR, and automation failure on the 
likelihood that a participant would crash. The logistic regression model was statistically 
significant, χ2(2) = 41.053, p < .001. The model explained 54.1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in accuracy and correctly classified 79.8% of cases. Holding lighting condition constant, 
participants in the failure condition were 69.74 times more likely to crash than participants in the 
TOR condition, Wald χ2 = 15.82, p < .001. However, lighting condition was not significant, 
Wald χ2 = .82, p = .365, odds ratio = 1.74. There were lower accuracy rates for the failure 
condition (M = 38%) compared to the TOR condition (M = 98%). Numerically, participants in 
the failure condition performed worse in the nighttime (29% or 6 out of 21 participants avoided 
crashing) compared to the daytime (48% or 10 out of 21 participants avoided crashing). These 
results partially supported Hypothesis 5b, demonstrating that automation failure had more 
crashes than TOR. However, it did not confirm the expected main effect of lighting condition. 
See Figure 9 for graph of results. 




Figure 9. Accuracy as a function of error type and lighting condition. 
 
3.3.2 Reaction time. RT was operationalized as the time interval between the moment 
the hazard was visible, which is the same moment the TOR was issued, and the first reaction (1-
degree wheel turn). A total of 27 (32%) participants who crashed were not included in this 
analysis. 
A significant main effect was found for the error type, such that average RTs in the TOR 
condition were significantly faster than those in the automation failure condition (Ms = 3.20s and 
4.05s, respectively), F(3, 56) = 6.62, p = .013, ηp2 = .11. No significant effect of lighting 
condition was found, F(3, 56) = 1.34, p = .253, ηp2 = .03. Because crash trials were not used, it 
might not reflect the true performance because more people crashed in the nighttime condition 
than the daytime. However, even when considering participants who crashed as the maximum 
RT (5.82 s) instead of eliminating them from analysis, the conclusions were still the same for the 
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error condition (Ms = 3.26s for TOR and 5.15s Failure), F(3, 56) = 54.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .41, and 
for the lighting condition (Ms = 4.02s for Daytime and 4.39s for Nighttime), F(3, 56) = 2.02, p = 
.159, ηp2 = .03. Hypothesis 5a was also partially confirmed because RT was faster for 
participants in the TOR as compared to the failure condition. However, the expected difference 
in lighting condition did not occur (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10. RT for error type and lighting condition with crash trials removed. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
3.4 Usefulness of Automation (UAS) 
The usefulness of the automation was rated at the end of the experiment. UAS data were 
missing for six participants due to technical problems with collection and those participants were 
excluded from the UAS analysis. To test Hypothesis 4 that UAS should show that errorless 
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automation was found most useful, followed by TOR, and failure to be least useful, a 2x3 
ANOVA with lighting condition and error type was conducted to evaluate differences between 
groups. Results show that the main effect of error type was significant F(2, 108) = 3.11, p = .048, 
ηp2 = .06, such that errorless automation was rated as significantly more useful than failure 
automation, t(108) = 2.43, p = .017. The difference between TOR and no error was marginally 
significant, t(108) =1.95, p = .054, showing that TOR was found to be not as useful as the no 
error automation. TOR was not significantly different than failure, t(108) = 0.45, p = .651, 
indicating that the two had similar usefulness. The main effect of lighting condition was not 
significant F(1, 108) = .083, p = .774, ηp2 = .01, nor was the interaction between lighting 
condition and error type, F(2, 108) = 1.86, p = .160, ηp2 = .03. These results support Hypothesis 
4, which expected UAS results to match with those of trust. The automated driving system in the 
no error condition was trusted more and found to be more useful than both the automated driving 
system in the TOR and Failure conditions. See Figure 11 for graph of results. 
 




Figure 11. UAS for error type and lighting condition. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
  





This study investigated the patterns of trust displayed by drivers of autonomous vehicles 
across seven drives in daytime and nighttime environments for three different types of 
automation responses (no error, TOR, and failure) to critical events. Trust was assessed after 
each drive to investigate learned trust, trust decline, and trust repair for drivers of autonomous 
vehicles. Daytime and nighttime conditions were expected to be a proxy for drive difficulty, 
although results did not confirm this. Ratings of drive difficulty did not differ between daytime 
and nighttime conditions. However, ratings of drive difficulty were different between error 
conditions, suggesting that participants rated difficulty based on performance of the automation 
as opposed to the lighting conditions. Results showed differences in trust for the error conditions, 
meaning that the performance of the car can influence participants’ level of trust. Additionally, 
results provided evidence for dynamically learned trust through experience with the system, trust 
declines due to system errors, and baseline trust repair after an error. 
4.1 Subjective Trust 
4.1.1 Pre-drive Trust. The demonstration of what the automation could do helped 
participants establish a reasonable baseline that was founded on actual experience and not on 
preconceived notions of what automated driving could or should be. As the results showed, 
participants had similar trust levels for each of the three error type conditions or between the 
daytime and nighttime conditions. An interesting finding was that the Automated Driving 
Opinion Survey (ADOS) was shown to be equivalent to the pre-drive trust. The ADOS gathered 
participants’ opinions about automated driving to discern what trust levels were like before 
experiencing the automation. This result shows that participants’ previously held opinions for 
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automated vehicles matched trust in the automated vehicle in the demonstration. This result was 
expected because most individuals have neutral, somewhat positive, or positive opinions about 
using automated driving (Kyriakidis et al., 2015) and the demonstration showed them positive 
aspects about automated driving. 
4.1.2 Overall Trust. As predicted, participants in the no error automation condition 
trusted the automation more than those in the TOR and failure conditions. This was expected 
because the no error condition did not demonstrate any problems, so there was no reason for 
participants to lose trust in the automation. In contrast, automation errors can degrade trust (Hoff 
& Bashir, 2015; Lee & See, 2004) as can TOR (Hergeth, Lorenz, Krems, & Toenert, 2015). 
However, the finding that TORs can decrease trust was in contrast to findings from previous 
works that showed no differences between trust before and after a TOR (Gold, Körber, 
Hohenberger, Lechner, & Bengler, 2015; Körber, Prasch, & Bengler, 2018). These authors argue 
that TORs are not perceived as failures, so they should not decrease trust in the automation. 
Nevertheless, the driver might not understand why the vehicle is issuing a TOR and may 
perceive it to be a result of an automation failure, especially if they are not well versed in the 
limitations of automation. Automation transparency is the idea that an automated system 
provides the user with information about what it is doing and why it is doing it. Previous 
research has shown that added transparency can help improve operator trust and performance 
(Adams & Webb, 2003; Lyons et al., 2016). Explaining the specific reasons for a TOR to a 
human driver could help the driver better understand and utilize the system. 
In the present experiment, the TOR was issued without explanation to avoid an 
unexpected construction hazard. Gold et al., (2015) and Körber et al., (2018) measured trust pre- 
and post-drive but allowed participants to continue driving after the TOR. Körber et al., (2018) 
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manipulated if an explanation was given for why the TOR occurred, which showed no trust 
difference from the control. However they manipulated TOR behavior within groups, meaning 
participants saw a TOR three separate times. Gold et al., (2015) did not offer explanations for 
TORs, but still had participants experience three TORs before the post-drive trust measure. The 
present experiment measured trust directly after the first and only critical hazard event and 
corresponding vehicle error. Perhaps in the other studies, trust was repaired back to normal levels 
through either explanations or multiple TORs before measurement. This explanation is supported 
by Hergeth et al. (2015) who found small decreases in trust directly after TOR that repaired over 
time, which mirrors the findings of the present study. Even though the present findings did not 
show trust repair back to pre-error levels, it did reach the level of initial learned trust and had a 
continuing positive trend. Differences between this study and Gold et al. and Korber et. al, like 
multiple TORs or explanations for TORs, could be the additional difference needed to repair 
trust back to normal levels. However, neither of those studies measure trust directly after the 
TOR, so it is difficult to compare their findings to those from the present study. The findings of 
this study add to previous understandings of how trust is affected by TORs by showing that the 
timing of trust measurement could provide differential resutls. It demonstrates that TORs can 
decrease trust in automated driving sitiatons, particularly if individuals are unaware of why a 
TOR was issued. 
 Because the construction in the driving lane was rapidly approaching, participants in the 
TOR condition might have felt that they did not have sufficient time to take over control from 
the automation. Even though the critical construction hazard scenario required participants to 
takeover at a relatively normal transition time of about 6 seconds, it still required fast action 
(Eriksson & Stanton, 2017). Large and colleagues (2019) found that acceptance of warnings was 
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lowest when the TTC was shortest. However, their short TTC was two seconds as compared to 
six seconds in the present study. Further information from participants about their thought 
processes is needed before any conclusion could be made. 
4.1.3 Dynamically Learned Trust. Pre-drive and drives 1-3 showed an overall increase 
in trust. This demonstrates that there was a building of trust as participants gained more 
experience with the system. This demonstrates that as participants became more familiar with an 
errorless driving automation, their trust in the automation improved. Initial levels of trust in the 
system were moderate, which makes sense because they had little to no experience with the 
system. The automated driving system was errorless through the first three drives and trust 
should increase because an errorless automation system should have high levels of trust. Thus, 
the increase over the first three drives demonstrates proper trust calibration (Hancock et al., 
2011; Lee & See, 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). This initial development of trust is a 
promising display of how trust might grow in an initial experience with an automated vehicle. 
However, the participants in the no error automation condition did not continue the positive trend 
through all seven drives. Even when alarms and warnings are highly reliable, human 
performance and trust in automation may not always match the reliability level (Bliss & Acton, 
2003; Chen et al., 2018). Participants in the present study had to learn the reliability of the 
system over time because they were not explicitly told a reliability percentage. Previous research 
shows that there can be differences if people are explicitly told a systems reliability versus if they 
need to infer the reliability through experience (i.e., the description-experience gap; Hertwig, 
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Chen et al., 2018). Human-human trust and human-automation 
trust can take a long time to learn and develop (Adams & Webb, 2003). Therefore, it could take 
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more time and experience with an automated driving system than participants had in this study to 
develop high levels of trust. 
In the current study, the automation was able to demonstrate its capabilities several times 
during each drive by avoiding multiple hazards. However, participants might not have perceived 
all the potential hazards present in each drive. Real-world automated vehicles must constantly 
monitor the environment and surrounding objects to continue driving forward and predict and 
avoid any potential upcoming hazards. Research on vigilance has shown that participants’ 
attention and ability to monitor decreases with time spent on task (Cabrall, Happee, & de Winter, 
2016; Mackworth, 1948). As the participants spent more time with the automated driving system 
which required no input from them, they may have become less vigilant and prone to mind-
wandering. The easiness of the task in the no error condition probably contributed to a lack of 
vigilance and inattention to the automation’s performance. Vigilance and attentional measures 
would be helpful to see how participants are engaging in the driving task over time.  
Various studies have focused on how to increase user acceptance and use of autonomous 
vehicles through matching personal driving style with automation performance (De Gelder et al., 
2016; Kuderer, Gulati, & Burgard, 2015; Li, Li, Cheng, & Green, 2017). De Visser et al. (2018) 
give a hypothetical situation where a human driver is getting anxious because his automated 
vehicle is switching lanes rapidly and the following distance is uncomfortably close. The 
automation used in the current experiment had many instances of varied braking behaviors at 
signs and lights or passing and avoidance behaviors for vehicles and objects. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that some participants did not feel entirely comfortable with the driving strategy of 
the automated vehicle. Thus, this could be a valid explanation for why trust in the no error 
condition stagnated. People do not yet have much experience with automated vehicles, and thus 
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it could take longer to adapt to their driving style or become comfortable with automated driving. 
It is important for designers and researchers to consider that it might take a while for individuals 
to adapt to an automated driving style. Trust and adaptation to automated driving might take 
longer to develop than previously expected. 
4.1.4 Drive 4 Trust. Looking specifically at drive 4 where error type was manipulated, 
trust was significantly different for the no error condition, but there was no significant difference 
between TOR and failure. As discussed previously in the overall trust section, the TOR was 
expected to decrease trust less because it was a warning as opposed to an automation failure. 
Reasons for this finding echo the reasons discussed for the lack of overall trust differences. 
However, the decrease in trust directly after the critical hazard seems to be at least numerically 
greater for failure than for TOR. Follow-up equivalence test determined that equivalence of trust 
between TOR and failure for drive 4 could not be concluded. Therefore, this should not be taken 
as conclusive evidence that the two are different. The future research section discusses plans to 
further test the trust decline between TOR and failure. 
4.1.5 Trust Repair. For the three drives after drive 4, trust was slowly repaired for the 
TOR and Failure drives. However, the increase did not continue upward, but remained at the 
same level for the last two drives. The findings of the study indicated that although trust can 
rebound after a critical event, it still did not reach trust levels where no problem had occurred. 
TORs and automation failures can have a lasting effect on trust, which can potentially hurt later 
human-automation collaboration. Participants likely did not know the exact cause of the problem 
and could have worried that another error could happen again, with no way to predict it. 
This experiment did not use any specific trust repair intervention strategy but relied only 
on subsequent errorless trials to help establish a theoretical baseline for trust repair for automated 
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driving (de Visser et al., 2018). The baseline repair in this case shows that a small increase did 
occur, but recovery did not continue. The automated driving system in the current study 
technically ‘ignored’ the failure, but this would be typical of situations in automated driving, in 
which the system did not notice a hazard, thus it wouldn’t know if a repair strategy was even 
necessary. Hence, the system is not intentionally ignoring the failure, it just was not capable of 
responding to the failure. It is not clear where TORs fit into the repair strategy framework list 
proposed by de Visser et al., (2018) because they offer more information that a failure, but still 
do not invoke a repair strategy. The warning that a hazard is upcoming is a correct notification, 
but the automation has failed to do the job of driving autonomously. Perhaps it is a less explicit 
form of ‘Recognize’ in that the automation admits it cannot properly function and requests help. 
No supporting evidence or research has been provided for the recognize repair strategy by de 
Visser et al., (2018). If the failure to maintain automated driving is thought of as the error, then 
the TOR could be conceptualized as a ‘Request Help’ repair strategy to alleviate a loss of trust 
and to prevent a crash. If automated vehicle systems are to be human-automation collaboration 
teams, requesting help when one member of the team is unable to manage the problem is 
appropriate. Further research with automated driving system repair strategies can help identify 
which strategies work best and how TORs relate to trust repair. 
4.2 Drive Difficulty 
Difficulty rating was expected to be higher for nighttime driving. However, the observed 
difference was not significant. There are objective differences between daytime and nighttime 
driving that the subjective difficulty rating must not have captured. Nighttime driving has lower 
levels of overall luminance leading to hampered focal vision which could cause difficulty 
noticing and recognizing low luminance objects (Leibowitz & Owens, 1982). Additionally, 
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Plainis and Murray, (2002) showed that low luminance conditions lead to slower reaction times 
and can be a reason for the increase in rate and severity of crashes during the nighttime (Clarke 
et al., 2006). A study by Konstantopoulos, Chapman, and Crundall (2010) showed that drivers 
had longer fixations on objects during nighttime driving, resulting in longer processing times. 
These three studies demonstrate the objective differences between daytime and nighttime 
driving, indicating that driving at night is more difficult. One self-report study showed that night 
driving is perceived as more difficult and demanding compared to daytime driving. Participants 
could not compare lighting levels because they only saw either the daytime or nighttime 
condition, so they could not compare them might not have considered light levels in their rating.  
Further evidence that difficulty reflected a different construct than lighting was the drive 
and error condition interaction. Participants in the failure condition rated drive 4 as significantly 
more difficult than those in TOR and no error. The drives were identical other than the 
automation performance, so participants must have considered automation performance when 
estimating difficulty. In addition, the significant difference in accuracy performance between 
TOR and no error conditions indicate that the participants’ own performance was affecting their 
difficulty rating. More participants crashed in the failure condition than the TOR condition, so 
they may have rated it more difficult.  
Drive difficulty for the drives after the critical event (drives 5-7) was higher for the 
failure condition than the no error condition. Even though the drives were identical, participants 
who saw the failure in drive 4 rated subsequent drives as more difficult. This finding suggests 
that the failure led participants to believe the drives were more difficult due to the automation’s 
lower performance. The failure could be acting as a cognitive anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1992). The failure event caused participants to rate drive 4 at high 
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difficulty, anchoring participants ratings at a higher reference level. Then for subsequent drives, 
ratings for difficulty are higher due to the high anchor. 
Findings from previous research show that there are no significant trust differences if the 
participant does not perceive the task as difficult (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & 
Beck, 2003; Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006; Schwark, Dolgov, Graves, & Hor, 2012). 
These previous studies mirror the findings of the current study because participants did not rate 
the two lighting conditions as different for difficulty. Thus, no trust differences were found 
between the lighting conditions due to lack of perceived difficulty. 
4.3 Driver Performance 
The performance results help inform how much participants gained or lost in terms of 
safety by having either an errorless aid, a warning (TOR), or no automation help (failure). 
Participants in the no error condition did not need to respond because the automation avoided the 
critical event for them. Therefore, no performance data were obtained in the no error condition. 
 4.3.1 Accuracy. Participants in the nighttime condition were expected to have more 
crashes in the failure condition due to it being more difficult to see the upcoming hazard. There 
were numerically more people that crashed in the nighttime than the daytime (36% versus 29%), 
but it was not statistically significant. More than 50% of participants in both the daytime and 
nighttime failure conditions crashed, indicating the task was likely difficult regardless of lighting 
conditions. This could have been because drivers had only six seconds to realize that the 
automation had failed and to react to the potential collision. In contrast, very few participants in 
the TOR condition crashed (1%). This indicates that the taking-over task itself was not too 
difficult, but taking-over without a warning made the task more difficult. Current data could not 
inform whether participants were simply trusting that the automation would avoid the hazard or 
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if attention had waned. Future researchers should investigate vigilance and use eye tracking to 
determine attention. 
4.3.2 RT. As expected, participants who received the TOR were significantly faster than 
those in the failure condition. The warning helped participants recognize the need to act because 
the automated system was not going to avoid the hazard. Participants in the failure condition 
were likely waiting for the automation to act, and it took longer to realize that action was 
required. Often, participants realized too late, leading to the crashes described earlier. 
These performance measures are not new findings, but rather a confirmation of past 
research that warnings improve RT and accuracy (Porter, Irani, & Mondor, 2008; Ruscio, Ciceri, 
& Biassoni, 2015; Xiang, Yan, Weng, & Li, 2016). However, this confirmation served to 
demonstrate that the experimental construct was valid and any discussion about trust between 
these conditions could be considered appropriate. In addition, the RT measures helped 
demonstrate how these scenarios compare. Showing that the errorless automation was safer than 
the TOR condition demonstrates how important it is to limit the amount of times TOR are 
required. Additionally, these results show baseline performance for TORs and automation 
failures and can be used in comparison with different warning types to test their effectiveness. 
4.4 Limitations and Future Research 
The current study used a seven-drive framework to look at trust development over time. 
Although the seven-drive timespan is longer than typical automated driving studies, it is still a 
relatively short period. Future researchers should investigate effectiveness of trust repair 
strategies using longitudinal designs. More experience and interactions with an automated 
driving system could change the way a user trusts and interacts with the system (Adams & 
Webb, 2003; Hoff & Bashir, 2015). As automated driving systems become more popular in the 
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commercial market, it will be important to measure how people are using, trusting, and learning 
about their systems. 
No active trust repair strategy was used for this study. However, this was done 
intentionally to examine how trust could be repaired naturally without any intervention so that 
later studies could be compared to the baseline. The current design could be modified to integrate 
actual trust repair strategies such as apologize, explain, and emotionally regulate, as discussed in 
de Visser et al. (2018). Some of these strategies incorporate a more transparent system that tells 
the operator about why the automation is performing a certain way. The explain strategy is an 
explicit and active form of automation transparency where the automation intentionally tries to 
repair trust. Automation transparency can provide varying levels of information regarding its 
actions or present them less explicitly or only upon request. Comparing the baseline repair of 
trust found in this study to active trust repair strategies should demonstrate effectiveness of the 
repair strategy and inform designers of the best strategies for trust repair.  
Other methods of TOR could be implemented to further investigate how ‘Request Help’ 
could be achieved. For example, semantic TORs could be issued that explain exactly why the 
automation needs the human driver to take over. Instead of uninformative beeps as is traditional 
in most TORs, specific information regarding the systems limitations could help assuage some of 
the misunderstandings associated with TORs. Special focus towards getting the human driver 
and the automated driving system to work as a collaborative partnership, as in human-human 
relationships could be helpful for performance and utility.  
Anthropomorphized agents could be used to foster a relationship closer to that of a 
human-human team. For example, an automated driving system could have a personalized voice, 
much like that of a GPS or smart home assistants like the Google Assistant or Amazon Alexa 
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(Forster, Naujoks, & Neukum, 2017). Anthropomorphism has been shown to increase trust and 
trust resilience in automated systems (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; de Visser et al., 2016), and some 
research has already been applied the idea to automated driving vehicles (Forster, Naujoks, & 
Neukum, 2017; Häuslschmid et al., 2017, Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014). Future researchers 
should implement an anthropomorphized agent to personalize the automated driving system to 
investigate if trust resilience can be improved. 
Another problem of the current study is that trust was self-reported on a Likert scale. 
Self-report trust scales tend to have moderate results overall and people tend to underestimate the 
reliability of automated support systems (Sanchez, Fisk, & Rogers, 2004), which could be a 
reason trust did not continue to grow. Additionally, the trust measure was given to participants 
eight separate times, which could have caused survey fatigue. In future studies it would be 
beneficial to have a shorter questionnaire so that participants do not spend so much time filling 
out surveys. Additionally, objective measures of trust such as eye tracking and physiological 
measures could be implemented as either a complimentary measure or a sole measure so that the 
drive is not interrupted.  
This study utilized a convenience sample of undergraduate participants, which is not 
necessarily externally valid and generalizable to all populations. Replicating the experiment with 
different populations would help designers know how to design automated driving systems to fit 
different markets. Additionally, testing professional truck drivers or ride-sharing drivers like 
Uber or Lyft could yield potentially interesting differences from the general population. 
Only two types of errors were tested in this experiment. In real-world situations, many 
different things could go wrong in an automated driving vehicle. Researchers should also consider 
investigating development of trust for different types of errors such as automation lane departure 
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and incorrect hazard warnings. The timing and number of errors can also be adjusted to see if trust 
decline and repair still follows similar trajectories. Different driving styles for the automated 
driving system could be tested to confirm if preferred driving style can impact trust. Perhaps 
driving style can be adjusted for each participant, the rates of trust can increase faster and higher.  
 Drive difficulty should still be investigated, but there are likely more effective ways of 
manipulating difficulty. Lighting condition could benefit from a within-groups design to allow 
drivers to compare the drive between conditions. Different types of difficulty such as high-traffic 
versus low-traffic situations or adverse weather conditions could also be implemented as a form 
of difficulty. As automation improves, more drivers will become engaged with secondary, non-
driving-related tasks, which could result in different trust development over time. Because the 
automation is improved, users might have higher levels of initial learned trust resulting in a 
lower magnitude of dynamically learned trust development. Additionally, lower engagement 
with the system could result in the human-out-of-the-loop, leading to more severe consequences 
due to longer takeover times and larger impacts on trust (Eriksson & Stanton, 2017). 
Consequently, secondary tasks can also be intermixed to determine if different patterns of trust 
occur. 
4.5 Conclusion  
 The results of the current study provide a theoretical baseline of how trust in automated 
driving systems develops over time and how automation errors shape this development of trust. 
The study did not demonstrate differences for trust between daytime and nighttime driving, 
which was due to a lack of perceived difficulty difference between the lighting conditions. Trust 
in automated vehicles was slow to develop and never reached high levels. TORs and automation 
failures have similar effects, decreasing trust directly after a critical event. Trust repair without 
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an active repair strategy is observed, although it does not reach previous levels of trust before the 
critical event. Designers should pay careful attention to the amount of time drivers have spent 
with automation because trust could take longer to develop than previously expected. 
Additionally, TORs and automation failures can both be costly, and trust is slow to repair. 
Therefore, limiting errors and implementing active trust repair systems could prove useful for 
maintaining efficient human-automation collaboration. 
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A PRIORI POWER ANALYSIS 
Using a 2 (A: Lighting Condition) x 3 (B: Error Type) x 7 (C: Drive) mixed design with 
all interaction terms and the A and B terms as between-groups and C as within-groups, the power 
analysis software performed 100 simulations to estimate the power of an N of 90, 120, and 150. 
 
  




DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SURVEY 
 




AUTOMATED DRIVING OPINION SURVEY 
The purpose of this survey is to gather your experience with manual driving and your opinions 
on automated driving. The following is a description of the levels of driving automation from the 
2016 SAE Taxonomy and Definitions for Driving Automation systems that is referenced in the 
following survey.  
• Manual driving: The human driver executes the driving task him/herself using the 
steering wheel and pedals. 
• Partially Driving Automation: The automated driving system takes over both speed and 
steering control on some roads. However, the system cannot handle all possible 
situations. Therefore, the driver shall permanently monitor the road and be prepared to 
take over control at any time. 
• Conditional Driving Automation: The automated driving system takes over both speed 
and steering control on most roads. The driver is not required to permanently monitor the 
road. If automation cannot handle a situation it provides a take-over request, and the 
driver must take-over control with a time buffer of 7 s. 
• Highly Driving Automation: The automated driving system takes over both speed and 
steering control on all roads. The driver is not required to permanently monitor the road. 
There is no expectation of the user to respond to a request to intervene. 
• Full Driving Automation: The system takes over speed and steering control completely 
and permanently, on all roads and in all situations. The driver sets a destination via a 
touchscreen. The driver cannot drive manually, because the vehicle does not have a 
steering wheel. 
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APPENDIX C (Continued) 
 
Question Unit/Coding 
1.      Have you read and understood the above instructions? 
1 = Yes 
2.      The definitions given in the instructions are clear to me. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
4.      What is your primary mode of transportation? 1= Private Vehicle, 2= Public Transportation, 3= 
Motorcycle, 4= Walking, 5= Other 
5.      At what age did you obtain your first driver’s license? 
Year 
6.      On average, how often did you drive a vehicle in the last 12 months? 
1=Never, 6=Every Day 
7.      About how many miles did you drive in the last 12 months? 
1=0, 2=1-5000, …, 11= more than 50,000 
8.      Have you ever heard of the Google Driverless Car (Waymo) or other driverless 
cars? 2=No, 1=Yes 
9.      The idea of fully automated driving is fascinating. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
10.  Manual driving is enjoyable. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
11.  Partially Driving Automation will be enjoyable. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
12.  Conditional Driving Automation will be enjoyable. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
13.  Highly Driving Automation will be enjoyable. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
14.  Fully Driving Automation will be enjoyable. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
15.  Partially Driving Automation will be easier than manual driving. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
16.  Conditional Driving Automation will be easier than manual driving. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
17.  Highly Driving Automation will be easier than manual driving. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
18.  Fully Driving Automation will be easier than manual driving. 
1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
19.  Some modern cars are equipped with Adaptive Cruise Control (a system that can 
automatically follow another car). How often did you use Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) 
when driving in the last 12 months? 1=Never, 6=Every Day, (-1 = I do not have ACC, -2= I do 
not know what ACC is) 
20.  I would be comfortable driving in a fully automated driving vehicle without a 
steering wheel. 1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
21.  The idea of fully automated driving is silly. Scientists should focus on other, more 
important, research topics. 1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
22.  I believe that within 30 years, automated driving systems will be so advanced that it 
will be irresponsible to drive manually. 1= Disagree Strongly, 7= Agree Strongly 
 
  




HUMAN-COMPUTER TRUST QUESTIONNAIRE  
All questions were rated on a 1-7 (Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree) Likert scale. 
 
Instructions - “This survey sometimes uses language like, "actions", "decision", and "problem". 
Please interpret these in the context of the driving automation system. 'Problems' are potential 
hazards on the road, 'Actions' are movements that the vehicle makes, and 'Decisions' are actions 
taken in response to problems where multiple different actions could be made.” 
1. The automated driving system always acts in a way that I would agree with 
2. The automated driving system performs reliably 
3. The automated driving system responds the same way under the same conditions at different times 
4. I can rely on the system to function properly 
5. The automated driving system analyzes problems consistently 
6. The automated driving system uses appropriate methods to reach decisions 
7. The automated driving system has sound knowledge about navigating the driving environment built into it 
8. The actions the automated driving system produces is as good as that which a highly competent person 
could produce 
9. Please select the "Correct answer" option – Response 2 was changed to “Correct answer” 
10. The automated driving system makes use of all the knowledge and information available to it to produce its 
solution to the problem 
11. I know what will happen the next time I use the automated driving system because I understand how it 
behaves 
12. I understand how the automated driving system will make decisions 
13. Although I may not know exactly how the automated driving system works, I know how to use it 
14. It is easy to follow what the automated driving system does 
15. I recognize what I need to do when the automated driving system is taking action 
16. I believe actions from the automated driving system are safe even when I don’t know for certain that it is 
correct 
17. When I am uncertain about an action, I believe the automated driving system rather than myself 
18. If I am not sure about an action, I have faith that the automated driving system will provide the best 
solution 
19. When the automated driving system takes unusual actions, I am confident that the action is correct 
20. Even if I have no reason to expect the automated driving system will be able to solve a difficult 
problem, I still feel certain that it will 
21. I would feel a sense of loss if the automated driving system was unavailable and I could no longer use it 
22. I feel a sense of attachment to using the automated driving system 
23. I find the automated driving system suitable to my style of driving 
24. I like using the automated driving system for driving 
25. I have a personal preference for driving with the automated driving system 
  





USEFULNESS OF AUTOMATED SYSTEM SURVEY 
Questions marked with an asterisk were reverse coded. Questions marked with a 
superscript x were not included in the calculation of usefulness due to a monetary requirement or 
implication. 
Variable Question Scale 
Discharge of the 
driver due to 
automation 
Highly Automated Driving decreases my problems while driving. 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Highly Automated Driving enables me to manage useful activities 
while driving. 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
The system saves time that I would have lost driving manually. 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Safety Gain 
The system increases road safety 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
The system prevents traffic violations 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
The system supports the driver to detect hazards in time  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
The system contributes to reduce crash risk  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Safety Loss 
The system distracts from detecting hazards in time* 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I drive safer than the vehicle in HAD mode* 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Highly Automated Driving is vulnerable for new hazards like hacker 
attack and issues with data safety* 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
To me, new risks that emerge from Highly Automated Driving 
appear to be more serious* 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Perceived control 
of conduct 
It is likely that I can use the system  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
There is no reason why I should not be able to use it  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Whether I can use Highly Automated Driving is dependent upon me  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I probably could not operate Highly Automated Driving* 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I could not afford a Highly Automated Driving systemx 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I don’t have any money for additional functions in my carx 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
For me, additional comfort functions are of high valuex 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Highly Automated Driving is not available for my vehicle typex 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
Intention of use 
I would like to have this system in my car  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I would consider the use of the system  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I would not use the system in any case  1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
I would purchase the system together with my next carx 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7= Strongly Agree 
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